of emotion. Greenwood provides a sharp logical analysis of the theoretical premises and conclusions to be found in such theories and exposes some fundamental errors and/or confusions. Most of these are related to the mistaken presumption that the act of verbal labeling is actually constitutive for the occurrence of emotion as a phenomenon (refer to p. 11 of Greenwood's article). Greenwood is not opposed to the idea that the emotions are socially constituted.
However, he bases his view on the notion that an emotion consists of the representation of intensional contents directed upon intentional objects in the social world.
More precisely, he advances three bases for the social constitution of-emotion:
(1) The socio-culturally specific evaluation and representation of reality; (2) the close relationship of emotion phenomena to socially constrained "identity projects"; and (3) social discourse as the "ontological vehicle" for emotion.
While I agree with many of Greenwood's points, I would like to raise a number of objections to his analysis.
SOCIAL EVALUATION AND REPRESENTATION
Greenwood seems to argue for evaluative representation as the basis for all emotion differentiation. I could not agree more. Several cognitive appraisal theories (Frijda, 1986 (Frijda, , 1987 Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984 Scherer, , 1986 Smith & Ellsworth, 1985 , 1987 Weiner, 1985; see Scherer, 1988 Rota, 1991). But I do not believe that many emotion experiences are constituted in "working them out" with others, particularly in verbal f'orm.
DISCUSSION
Greenwood asks many intriguing questions relevant to the issue of' the social constitution of emotion, f'or example, the possibility of' mistaken labeling. These questions are most useful to organize the theoretical and conceptual work that still needs to be done to arrive at a consensually shared definition of emotion.
However, his own analysis remains partial, and I believe partly contradictory, because
(1) it lacks a comprehensive view of' the emotion process, and (2) it conf'uses issues of' self-knowledge and of' labeling.
The emotion process
Greenwood neglects important psychological and physiological components of the emotion process. It is just not the case that the representation of the intensional content of intentional objects and the actions related to these are sufficient to characterize the emotion process. Physiological symptoms, expressive behavior, and feeling state are all part and parcel of the emotion process and, since they are partially independent and organized differently on both the psychological and physiological levels, they cannot simply be subsumed under action tendencies.
Self-knowledge and labeling
It would seem to me that all self-knowledge includes some proprioceptive feedback. Greenwood is worried about "internal things in the mind" that people keep disagreeing about when they try to use introspection.
Yet, obviously the term "feeling" refers to some kind of monitoring of many kinds of internal changes (cognitive, motor, and physiological). While Greenwood acknowledges this feedback for pain and tickles he does seem to rule it out for the emotions, something that would seem counter-intuitive not only to psychologists. The fact that philosophers and psychologists do not agree about typical introspective content for specific emotion labels is due to the fact that emotional experiences, even for very similar situations, are very different from one individual to another and that, indeed, emotion labels are not always used very consistently.
Thus, while Greenwood's paper raises a number of-interesting issues and points to ways of settling the controversy about the role of social factors in emotion, his own theoretical position is not entirely convincing. Most importantly, he does not take the total phenomenon of an emotion episode into account. The view that emotion can be described by intensional contents of intentional objects and related actions does not sufficiently reflect the biological and phylogenetic bases of emotion. The present analysis also neglects the important aspect of the dynamics of emotion, which is a process over time. Greenwood's view of the phenomenon remains static, a philosophical construction in terms of representation and intentions for action. Most importantly, Greenwood does not really succeed in the attempt to clarify the intricate relationships between experience, self-knowledge, and verbalization that are at the core of the controversy. He does succeed, however, in putting his finger on some of the most blatant misconceptions and in raising some central issues that are often conveniently forgotten by psychologists working on emotion.
